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ABSTRACT
The ‘European Semester’, a new framework for policy co-ordination across
European Union (EU) member states, represents a major step in EU
governance. Created in 2010 in the wake of the financial and sovereign debt
crises and revamped in 2015, it was intended to provide a new
socioeconomic governance architecture to co-ordinate national policies
without transferring full sovereignty to the EU level. This introduction offers a
brief overview and assessment of the European Semester, examining its
implications along three critical axes, running respectively between the
economic and the social, the supranational and the intergovernmental, and
the technocratic and democratic poles of EU governance. We introduce and
briefly summarize the seven other contributions that make up this collection.
Our conclusions are that the European Semester challenges established
theoretical understandings of EU governance, as it is a prime example of the
complexity that supersedes simple polar oppositions.
KEYWORDS Democracy; European Semester; intergovernmentalism; policy co-ordination;
socioeconomic governance; supranationalism; technocracy
1. Introduction
The ‘European Semester’ (hereafter ‘Semester’) is a new governance architec-
ture for socioeconomic policy co-ordination in the European Union (EU).
Created in 2010 in the wake of the financial and sovereign debt crises, the
Semester has been periodically revamped, most significantly by the Juncker
Commission in 2015. Its procedures build on, but also reformulate, the EU’s
pre-existing processes of fiscal, economic, employment and social policy co-
ordination, as these had developed during the 1990s and 2000s, including
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
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(BEPGs), the European Employment Strategy (EES), the Lisbon Strategy and
the Social Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC). The Semester was intro-
duced as part of a panoply of far-reaching measures aimed at reinforcing
EU economic governance in response to the euro crisis: the so-called ‘Six-
Pack’, ‘Two-Pack’ and ‘Fiscal Compact’. These measures included stronger
and more ‘automatic’ sanctions for the SGP’s Excessive Deficit Procedure
(EDP); a new Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) for detecting and
correcting non-fiscal imbalances (e.g., in the housing market or current
account) that could negatively affect other member states, based on a score-
board of economic indicators, in-depth country reviews and recommen-
dations, with financial sanctions for persistent non-compliance; ex ante
review by the Commission of euro area national budgets; and Reverse Quali-
fied Majority Voting (RQMV) for overturning Commission proposals under the
excessive deficit and imbalance procedures. The Semester was also intended
to serve as the governance architecture for ‘thematic co-ordination’ of
member state policies towards the ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’
objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, which was explicitly designed to
have a stronger social dimension than the preceding Lisbon Strategy, includ-
ing specific guidelines and targets on poverty and social inclusion.1
The Semester brings together within a single policy co-ordination cycle a
variety of EU governance instruments with different legal bases, from the
SGP, MIP and Fiscal Compact to the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Integrated
Economic and Employment Policy Guidelines. In this cycle, the Commission,
the Council of the EU (hereafter: Council) and the European Council set priori-
ties for the Union; review national performance, budgets and reform pro-
grammes; and issue Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs), backed up
in some cases by possible financial sanctions. Each member state receives a
single integrated set of CSRs, except for those under a bailout programme
(as in the case of Greece). The CSRs cover a wide range of policy fields, includ-
ing issues such as wage determination, education and health care, which fall
under the primary competence of member states and where the Union’s leg-
islative powers are severely limited. Although the Semester involves no legal
transfer of sovereignty from the member states to the EU level, it has given
the EU institutions a more visible and authoritative role than ever before in
monitoring, scrutinizing and guiding national economic, fiscal and social pol-
icies, especially within the euro area.
The Semester in its current form begins each November with the Commis-
sion’s Annual Growth Survey (AGS), which identifies the key reform priorities
for the EU and offers general policy guidance to the member states for the
coming year. The ‘autumn package’ includes the Commission’s Alert Mechan-
ism Report, which designates member states for MIP In-Depth Reviews (IDRs),
its opinion on euro area draft budgets and proposed recommendations for
the euro area as a whole, as well as the Joint Employment Report (which
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also covers social issues). In February, the Commission publishes detailed
Country Reports laying out its analysis of the key challenges and reform pro-
gress of each member state, including the conclusions of the MIP IDRs, which
are preceded and followed by intensive dialogue with national governments
and stakeholders. Based on the AGS and subsequent Council conclusions, the
March European Council adopts socioeconomic priorities and policy orien-
tations for the Union. By early April, the member states submit their National
Reform Programmes (NRPs) and fiscal Stability or Convergence Programmes.
In May, the Commission assesses these programmes and proposes CSRs,
which in turn are reviewed and sometimes amended by committees of
member state officials preparing the work of the Council, based on multilat-
eral implementation reviews of national reforms. The revised CSRs are then
endorsed by the European Council and adopted by the Council in late
June/early July. The European Parliament (EP) adopts resolutions and
reports on the AGS and the CSR each year, and may invite the Presidents of
the Commission, Council, European Council and Eurogroup to discuss the
Semester through the so-called ‘Economic Dialogue’.2 For a schematic depic-
tion of this process, see the Online Appendix.
Many observers believe that the European Semester represents a funda-
mental shift in EU socioeconomic governance. This collection analyses the
changes introduced by the Semester and considers their consequences for
the evolution of EU governance along three critical axes: the economic and
the social; the supranational and the intergovernmental; and the technocratic
and the democratic. Questions addressed under these rubrics include
whether the Semester is leading to the subordination of EU social objectives
and actors to economic imperatives of fiscal consolidation and competitive-
ness; whether EU socio-economic governance is becoming more suprana-
tional or more intergovernmental; and whether the Semester is promoting
technocratic expert-based governance at the expense of democratic delibera-
tion and accountability.
The contributions in this collection assess these critical dimensions of the
Semester based on first-hand empirical research into its practical operation,
without adopting a single unified theoretical perspective. Some focus primar-
ily on the socioeconomic axis (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, Bekker, Eihmanis), others
more on the supranational–intergovernmental axis (Maricut and Puetter,
Savage and Howarth), and still others on the technocratic–democratic axis
(Hallerberg et al., Crum), though many deal with more than one axis and all
address the Semester’s impact on the changing governance relationship
between the EU institutions and the member states. The contributors
employ a variety of conceptual lenses, including new/deliberative intergo-
vernmentalism (Maricut and Puetter), principal–agent analysis (Savage and
Howarth), actor-centred constructivism and the ‘usages of Europe’ (Zeitlin
and Vanhercke, Eihmanis), Europeanization (Hallerberg et al.), two-level
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games and normative democratic theory (Crum). The contributions also adopt
different methodological and data-gathering approaches, from original
surveys (Hallerberg et al.) to semi-structured interviews with key policy
actors and content analysis of primary documents (at both EU and national
levels). Taken together, they offer an authoritative state-of-the-art analysis
of the Semester’s implications for the evolution of EU socioeconomic govern-
ance since the crisis. In what follows, we review the literature on the Semester,
introduce the individual contributions, and highlight the collection’s most
salient findings.
2. Literature review
The existing literature on the European Semester has focused on a number of
major issues. One key theme in the early literature was how to characterize the
balance within the Semester between ‘hard’, rules-based elements derived
from the SGP and ‘softer’, more deliberative forms of policy co-ordination
associated with the OMC, with authors such as Armstrong (2013) and Bekker
(2013) emphasizing the hybrid character of the emerging governance architec-
ture. Another preoccupation has been to assess the Semester’s effectiveness,
especially by looking at national implementation of the CSRs. A number of
authors have criticized the member states’ limited response to the CSRs, with
Darvas and Leandro (2015) claiming that their annual rate of implementation
declined over time (from 40 per cent to 29 per cent) and was lower than the
unilateral recommendations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) (cf. also EP 2017; Hallerberg et al. 2011). Other
studies, notably by the Commission, find a higher cumulative rate of implemen-
tation,with two-thirds of CSRs showing at least ‘someprogress’by 2016, reflect-
ing the longer time horizon needed for major structural reforms (Deroose and
Griesse 2014; European Commission 2017a: 4–7). But more thorough assess-
ments of the Semester’s causal influence on national reforms require a different
research approach, based on comparative process tracing of the interplay
between EU and domestic policy-making, as in Eihmanis’s pioneering study
of Latvia (2017).
Many scholars have argued that the Semester’s governance architecture
inherently privileges economic goals and actors over their social counterparts
(e.g., Copeland and Daly 2015; Crespy and Menz 2015; de la Porte and Heins
2015). Others have found instead that this more integrated socioeconomic co-
ordination process offers new opportunities for defending and ‘mainstream-
ing’ EU social objectives (e.g., Bekker [2015]; Gómez Urquijo [2017]; Jessoula
[2015]; for a fuller review, see Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2017). The coming of
the Semester and other economic and financial governance innovations
adopted in response to the euro crisis has likewise triggered a major
debate about whether these should be characterized as primarily
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intergovernmental or supranational. Scholars such as Bickerton et al. (2015)
point to increased European integration in these areas without transferring
powers to supranational institutions, which they term ‘new’ intergovernment-
alism (cf. also Puetter 2014). Others point instead to the emergence of a ‘new
supranationalism’ (Dehousse 2016), resulting from the enhanced role of the
Commission and the ECB in the EU’s post-crisis economic governance
(Bauer and Becker [2014]; Savage and Verdun [2016]; for a fuller review of
the debate, see Schmidt [2016]).
Finally, many authors have expressed deep concern about the European
Semester as part of a broader set of measures introduced by the EU during
the sovereign debt crisis which have shifted governance responsibilities
away from democratic institutions, such as parliaments, into the hands of
unelected and unaccountable technocrats (e.g., Chalmers et al. [2016]; Crum
and Curtin [2015]; Dawson [2015]; Scharpf [2013]; for a fuller review, see
Crum 2017). Ironically, however, careful process-tracing research shows that
it was the EP rather than the Commission that pushed hardest for the
inclusion of the Semester and RQMV in the Six-Pack legislation (Chang
2013: 264–5; Laffan and Schlosser 2016: 240).
3. Our contribution
The next contribution in this collection, by Jonathan Zeitlin and Bart Vanhercke
2017, provides a detailed analysis of the ‘socialization’ of the Semester since
2011, defined as a growing emphasis on social objectives in its substantive
policy messages (including the CSRs) and an enhanced role for social and
employment actors in its monitoring, review and decision-making procedures.
Drawing on ‘actor-centred constructivism’ and the ‘usages of Europe’
approaches, the authors show how EU social and employment actors –
especially committees of national officials advising the Employment, Social
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO Council) – have helped to
change the ‘rules of the game’ and influence the positions of their economic
policy interlocutors within the Semester. These actors have reflexively revised
their own working methods and styles of argument to gain traction in ‘evi-
dence-based’ deliberation, while successfully pushing back against the Com-
mission’s perceived efforts to impose uniform, over-prescriptive
recommendations. As a result, the authors argue, not only has the integration
of EU social and economic policy co-ordination within the Semester become
more balanced, but its governance has also become more interactive and
less hierarchical.
The third contribution, by Sonja Bekker 2017, examines the role within the
Semester of ‘flexicurity’ as a leading EU policy concept developed before the
crisis aimed at reconciling flexibility and security in labour markets. Many
commentators have claimed that austerity measures adopted during the
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crisis led to the abandonment of flexicurity for a one-sided emphasis on flexi-
bility in EU labour-market policies. Based on a systematic content analysis of
key policy documents and CSRs, Bekker shows instead that flexicurity is not
only alive and well within the Semester, but has been revitalized by incorpor-
ating a wider range of social concerns (such as a lifecycle approach to social
security and improving transitions into stable jobs), in line with Zeitlin and
Vanhercke’s ‘socialization’ thesis. This redefinition of the concept, in her
view, demonstrates the Semester’s adaptability over time to changing
policy priorities, alongside its capacity to tailor CSRs to the variety of chal-
lenges facing member states through different combinations of flexicurity
elements.
The fourth contribution, by Adina Maricut and Uwe Puetter 2017, investi-
gates the relationship between the economic and social dimensions of the
Semester. Drawing on new/deliberative intergovernmentalist approaches,
they argue that the uneven evolution of the Semester’s co-ordination infra-
structure has produced an asymmetry between economic and social issues.
Not only are finance ministers better placed to build consensus through infor-
mal policy dialogue than their social and employment policy colleagues, but
they also have better access to the European Council and greater control of
the Semester’s policy priorities. Yet the authors also find that the Commission
and the committees advising social and employment ministers have managed
to gain a greater expert role in the Semester and to integrate more social
issues into the CSRs, even if this did not always lead to stronger political
endorsement by the European Council. Their analysis suggests that ongoing
asymmetries between economic and social issues within the Semester are
rooted less in their different Treaty bases than in contingent and corrigible
differences in the organization of the actors in the two domains, notably
the more fragmented structure of the EPSCO Council, its less frequent meet-
ings, and its insistence on conducting policy debates in televized public meet-
ings rather than behind closed doors.
The fifth contribution, by James D. Savage and David Howarth 2017
employs a principal–agent approach to analyse the politics of asymmetric
information in the EDP and MIP. The authors examine how the Commission
and the Council have sought to enforce the requirements of the Semester
as an information-driven surveillance system reliant on national budgetary
and economic statistics. They show that while the Six-Pack legislation gave
the Commission the right to investigate the compilation of member state
fiscal statistics and to impose financial sanctions for misconduct, the European
Central Bank and the EP have so far blocked efforts to give Eurostat similar
‘police patrol’ powers to ensure the reliability of MIP statistics. The contri-
bution focuses particularly on the imposition of financial penalties on Spain
for the misrepresentation of fiscal statistics by the Autonomous Community
of Valencia, the first such case in the history of Economic and Monetary
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Union (EMU), whose distinctive circumstances provide insight into the rare
conditions under which the Commission may be prepared to use its sanction-
ing powers over member states.
The sixth contribution, by Edgars Eihmanis 2017, examines the fascinating
case of Latvia, which experienced severe economic difficulties during the
financial crisis. Between 2008 and 2014, the country was simultaneously
subject to three EU economic governance frameworks – the European Seme-
ster, a Balance-of-Payments programme and the euro convergence criteria.
Eihmanis finds that the Latvian government ‘cherry-picked’ and instrumenta-
lized EU fiscal and economic targets, which it often exceeded. In contrast to
the literature portraying the Commission as a neoliberal actor pushing auster-
ity at the expense of social protection, he shows that in this case it played the
role of social policy advocate, repeatedly pressing the Latvian authorities for
stronger measures to help the poor – with some eventual success. The case
study thus sheds valuable light on the Semester’s influence on the relation-
ship between the Commission and member state governments, as well as
between economic and social policy objectives.
The seventh contribution, by Mark Hallerberg et al. 2017, analyses the role
of national parliaments in the Semester. Based on original survey data, the
authors trace whether national parliaments discuss and vote on national stab-
ility/convergence and reform programmes, as well as how their involvement
has changed over time. They find considerable variation among national par-
liaments as to whether debates on the Semester take place at all, and if so in
which committees at which stage of the process. Their research shows that
between 2012 and 2015, Budget/Finance committees played an increasingly
promising role in ex ante scrutiny of national planning documents as they
became more aware of the Semester’s impingement on their core business.
Counter-intuitively, however, it was parliaments in non-euro area member
states not subject to potential financial sanctions which were most active in
ex post review of the CSRs, suggesting that they were motivated more by
the pursuit of electoral advantage through symbolic contestation of EU invol-
vement in domestic reforms than by democratic concerns with the policy rec-
ommendations themselves.
Finally, the eighth contribution, by Ben Crum 2017, examines how the new
economic governance of the euro area has affected the ability of parliaments
(national and European) to scrutinize and control economic policy. It analyses
the specific challenges to parliamentary accountability that emerge when
executive power is shared between the national and the supranational
levels. It argues that such accountability has been compromised in EU post-
crisis economic governance because governments’ budgetary decisions are
constrained by the Semester and national parliaments find themselves on
the losing side of a reinforced two-level executive game, while the European
Parliament lacks effective powers to control the decisions of the European
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Council and the Commission in this field. The contribution concludes by pro-
posing guidelines for safeguarding parliamentary accountability in multilevel
settings like that of EU post-crisis economic governance, which the author
believes would reinforce the Semester’s character as a dialogical rather than
hierarchical process.
4. Conclusion
This collection has sought to assess the European Semester as a new architec-
ture of EU socioeconomic governance by examining its consequences along
three critical axes: the economic and the social; the intergovernmental and
the supranational; and the technocratic and the democratic. Taking the con-
tributions together, we find that that changes introduced by the Semester
cannot easily be captured by such polar oppositions, thereby challenging
established theoretical understandings of EU governance.
With regard to the economic–social axis, our contributions show that these
two poles of EU policy co-ordination have become increasingly closely inter-
twined within the Semester. Social objectives and actors have become more
prominent and influential over time in the Semester’s substantive policy
orientations and governance procedures, including the drafting, review and
adoption of the CSRs. But major national reforms in interdependent policy
fields like pensions, health care, labour-market regulation and social security
have both economic and social dimensions, which need to be taken into
account in framing EU recommendations, even if officials from each domain
might prefer to take decisions independently. While jurisdictional struggles
persist around overlapping issues, especially those linked to the SGP and
MIP, the contributions in this collection suggest that the Semester provides
a workable, if still imperfect framework for integrating EU social and economic
policy co-ordination, without sacrificing the objectives of either process.
On the intergovernmental–supranational axis, the contributions likewise
show that there is no simple winner. Member states do not control the Euro-
pean Semester, nor have supranational institutions become all-powerful.
Although the European Council formally remains the political master of the
Semester, it cannot and does not run the process itself. The Commission
plays a pivotal role in steering the Semester, having gained new powers
and developed new capacities to set priorities, review national policies and
performance, draft CSRs and propose sanctions under the EDP and MIP. But
the Commission does not exercise these powers and capacities in isolation
from national actors. Sectoral committees of member state officials, whose
detailed knowledge of national policy challenges and developments far
exceeds that of the Commission, have numerous opportunities to feed in
their views at key moments in the Semester process and have demonstrated
their ability to amend the Commission’s draft CSRs, drawing on evidence from
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their own complementary monitoring and review procedures. To enhance
national ownership of proposed reforms, the Commission now engages in
an increasingly intense bilateral and multilateral dialogue with a multiplicity
of actors from the member states at each stage in the Semester cycle.
Taken together, these developments have blurred the boundaries between
‘European’ and ‘national’ actors in EU policy co-ordination, and made it
increasingly difficult – and perhaps even irrelevant – to characterize the Seme-
ster as either intergovernmental or supranational.
Criticism of the Semester has perhaps been harshest in relation to the tech-
nocratic–democratic axis. Such criticism has concentrated on the limited role
of national and European parliaments in its decision-making processes. Yet
the contributions in this collection show that national parliaments, especially
within the euro area, have by no means fully exploited the opportunities avail-
able to them to debate the Semester’s policy orientations or to scrutinize its
recommendations. The EP, as previously noted, fought for the legislative codi-
fication of the Semester in its present form, as well as for the introduction of
RQMV for financial sanctions. Given limitations of time and expertise, as well
as the electoral incentives facing their members, it seems unrealistic to expect
most national parliaments to play a more active part in scrutinizing the Seme-
ster process. While there is a stronger case for extending the EP’s codecision
role in setting the Semester’s policy priorities and orientations, it could hardly
be expected to participate effectively in reviewing and adopting the CSRs.
Here, as the contributions in this collection show, it is within the apparently
‘technocratic’ components of the Semester – the ‘core group’ of Commission
DGs and the sectoral committees of member state officials advising the
Council – that much of the real contestation and debate about EU policy rec-
ommendations and the implementation of national reforms actually takes
place. Hence, as with the other two axes, a sharp polarization between the
Semester’s democratic and the technocratic dimensions seems both empiri-
cally and conceptually misplaced.
The European Semester, like EU post-crisis governance more generally, is a
work in progress. The Semester’s policy content and decision-making pro-
cedures have evolved considerably since its creation in 2010, and further revi-
sions have been mooted. The Five Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al. 2015)
envisaged using reinforced monitoring of national reforms within the Seme-
ster to drive convergence towards agreed binding standards, including in the
social field, a proposal which reappears in the Commission’s recent Reflection
Paper on Deepening EMU (European Commission 2017b). It remains unclear
for now how such arrangements would work in practice, and still more so
how far member states would be prepared to embrace them. But our assess-
ment of its first seven years suggests that the Semester has already reshaped
the architecture of EU governance in ways that challenge established theor-
etical understandings, by integrating the pursuit of social and economic
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objectives into an interactive cycle of deliberation between national and
supranational actors in which peer review by expert officials enhances
rather than restricts the scope for democratic debate.
Notes
1. For an overview of the Semester’s place in the evolution of EU socioeconomic
governance, see Zeitlin and Vanhercke (2014: 15–27); on the evolution of EU





semester-improvement (accessed 26 July 2017).
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